

**REMARKS**

The claims have been amended to clarify the invention. In particular, claim 15 has been amended to delete reference to non-elected sequences, SEQ ID NOs:7 and 8. Claims 26-39 have been canceled without prejudice. No new matter is added by this amendment and entry of the amendment is therefore requested.

**DETAILED ACTION**

The Examiner stated that the declaration under 37 CFR 1.131 filed in the previous response to Office Action is sufficient to overcome the Kikuno et al. reference. The Examiner also stated that the grounds of objection and/or rejection not explicitly stated and/or set forth below are withdrawn.

**35 U.S.C. § 112, Second Paragraph, Rejection of Claims 15, 16 and 19**

The Examiner has rejected claims 15, 16 and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point and distinctly claim the subject matter which applicant regards as the invention. In particular, the Examiner stated, claim 15 recites non-elected sequences SEQ ID NOs:7 and 8 and thus renders the claims encompassing more (than) one paternally distinct invention(s).

Applicants have amended claim 15 to delete reference to SEQ ID NOs:7 and 8. Withdrawal of the rejection is therefore requested.

**35 U.S.C. § 101, Rejection of Claims 15-16 and 19**

The Examiner has rejected claims 15-16 and 19 under 35 U.S.C. 101, because the claimed invention is not supported by either a well-established or disclosed specific and substantial credible utility.

The Examiner's rejection is based on two principle allegations: (1) that the specification only provides evidence for human tissue expression at the polynucleotide level NOT the biologically active protein level; and (2) the specification as filed does not disclose or provide evidence that points to an activity (biological role or/and therapeutic role) of the protein.

Additionally, there is no art of record that discloses or suggests any activity for the claimed protein.

Applicants Response

With respect to point (1) above, applicants have previously addressed this issue in the response filed November 2, 2002 (see pages 13-14 of that response). Applicants reiterate that it is well known in the art that while steady state mRNA levels are not always directly proportional to the amount of protein produced in a cell, mRNA levels are **routinely** used as an indicator of protein expression, and provided a textbook reference in support of this statement (see Lewin, 1997). The Examiner has now presented a single reference of Aebersold et al. (2000) in support of his contention that "at present, it has been widely accepted that the actual steady state level of mRNA molecules is not well correlated with actual protein abundance" (emphasis added). See current Office Action at page 4. Applicants submit that such a single reference as the Examiner has provided does not constitute evidence of a "widely accepted" point of view. At most, this article presents some of the difficulties encountered in predicting the levels of all protein expression in a "genome-wide analysis" (See Aebersold et al., INTRODUCTION, page 33). It does not suggest that protein expression cannot be inferred from RNA expression by a reasonable probability in this case. Applicants need only prove a "substantial likelihood" of utility; certainty is not required. *Brenner*, 383 U.S. at 532.

With respect to point (2), above, applicants have also pointed out previously that knowledge of the biological activity or function of a protein, e.g., SEQ ID NO:6, that is overexpressed in liver in response to a genotoxic agent such as PAH, is not necessary to use the protein, or antibodies raised to the protein, in monitoring a genotoxic response to PAH or in the diagnosis of diseases associated with PAH induction, such as cancer. See response to Office Action, filed November 2, 2002, page 12. Thus the Examiner's allegation that the activity or biological function of the claimed protein is somehow required for utility is without merit.

There is, in addition, direct proof of a utility for the claimed invention that is well established and apparent from the specification, and that is supported by the type of study alluded to by the Examiner relative to the need for "genome wide analysis" of proteins as proposed in the Aebersold article. Appellants submit with this brief the Declaration of L. Michael Furness describing some of the practical uses of the claimed invention in gene and protein expression

monitoring applications as they would have been understood at the time of the patent application. The Furness Declaration describes, in particular, how the claimed polypeptide can be used in protein expression analysis techniques such as 2-D PAGE gels and western blots. Using the claimed invention with these techniques, persons of ordinary skill in the art can better assess, for example, the potential toxic effect of a drug candidate. (Furness Declaration at ¶ 11).

The Patent Examiner does not dispute that the claimed polypeptide can be used in 2-D PAGE gels and western blots to perform drug toxicity testing. Instead, the Patent Examiner contends that the claimed polypeptide cannot be useful without precise knowledge of its function. But the law never has required knowledge of biological function to prove utility. It is the claimed invention's uses, not its functions, that are the subject of a proper analysis under the utility requirement.

In any event, as demonstrated by the Furness Declaration, the person of ordinary skill in the art can achieve beneficial results from the claimed polypeptide in the absence of any knowledge as to the precise function of the protein. The uses of the claimed polypeptide for gene expression monitoring applications including toxicology testing are in fact independent of its precise function.

## I. The Applicable Legal Standard

To meet the utility requirement of sections 101 and 112 of the Patent Act, the patent applicant need only show that the claimed invention is "practically useful," *Anderson v. Natta*, 480 F.2d 1392, 1397, 178 USPQ 458 (CCPA 1973) and confers a "specific benefit" on the public. *Brenner v. Manson*, 383 U.S. 519, 534-35, 148 USPQ 689 (1966). As discussed in a recent Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit case, this threshold is not high:

An invention is "useful" under section 101 if it is capable of providing some identifiable benefit. See *Brenner v. Manson*, 383 U.S. 519, 534 [148 USPQ 689] (1966); *Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.*, 977 F.2d 1555, 1571 [24 USPQ2d 1401] (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("to violate Section 101 the claimed device must be totally incapable of achieving a useful result"); *Fuller v. Berger*, 120 F. 274, 275 (7th Cir. 1903) (test for utility is whether invention "is incapable of serving any beneficial end").

*Juicy Whip Inc. v. Orange Bang Inc.*, 51 USPQ2d 1700 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

While an asserted utility must be described with specificity, the patent applicant need not demonstrate utility to a certainty. In *Stiftung v. Renishaw PLC*, 945 F.2d 1173, 1180, 20 USPQ2d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 1991), the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit explained:

An invention need not be the best or only way to accomplish a certain result, and it need only be useful to some extent and in certain applications: “[T]he fact that an invention has only limited utility and is only operable in certain applications is not grounds for finding lack of utility.” *Envirotech Corp. v. Al George, Inc.*, 730 F.2d 753, 762, 221 USPQ 473, 480 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

The specificity requirement is not, therefore, an onerous one. If the asserted utility is described so that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand how to use the claimed invention, it is sufficiently specific. See *Standard Oil Co. v. Montedison, S.p.a.*, 212 U.S.P.Q. 327, 343 (3d Cir. 1981). The specificity requirement is met unless the asserted utility amounts to a “nebulous expression” such as “biological activity” or “biological properties” that does not convey meaningful information about the utility of what is being claimed. *Cross v. Iizuka*, 753 F.2d 1040, 1048 (Fed. Cir. 1985).

In addition to conferring a specific benefit on the public, the benefit must also be “substantial.” *Brenner*, 383 U.S. at 534. A “substantial” utility is a practical, “real-world” utility. *Nelson v. Bowler*, 626 F.2d 853, 856, 206 USPQ 881 (CCPA 1980).

If persons of ordinary skill in the art would understand that there is a “well-established” utility for the claimed invention, the threshold is met automatically and the applicant need not make any showing to demonstrate utility. Manual of Patent Examination Procedure at § 706.03(a). Only if there is no “well-established” utility for the claimed invention must the applicant demonstrate the practical benefits of the invention. *Id.*

Once the patent applicant identifies a specific utility, the claimed invention is presumed to possess it. *In re Cortright*, 165 F.3d 1353, 1357, 49 USPQ2d 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1999); *In re Brana*, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566; 34 USPQ2d 1436 (Fed. Cir. 1995). In that case, the Patent Office bears the burden of demonstrating that a person of ordinary skill in the art would reasonably doubt that the asserted utility could be achieved by the claimed invention. *Id.* To do so, the Patent Office must provide evidence or sound scientific reasoning. See *In re Langer*, 503 F.2d 1380, 1391-92, 183 USPQ 288 (CCPA 1974). If and only if the Patent Office makes such a

showing, the burden shifts to the applicant to provide rebuttal evidence that would convince the person of ordinary skill that there is sufficient proof of utility. *Brana*, 51 F.3d at 1566. The applicant need only prove a “substantial likelihood” of utility; certainty is not required. *Brenner*, 383 U.S. at 532.

**II. The use of the claimed polypeptides for toxicology testing and drug discovery are sufficient utilities under 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 and 112, first paragraph**

The claimed invention meets all of the necessary requirements for establishing a credible utility under the Patent Law: There are “well-established” uses for the claimed invention known to persons of ordinary skill in the art, and there are specific practical and beneficial uses for the invention disclosed in the patent application’s specification. These uses are explained, in detail, in the Furness Declaration accompanying this brief. Objective evidence, not considered by the Patent Office, further corroborates the credibility of the asserted utilities.

**A. The uses of SEQ ID NO:6 for toxicology testing, drug discovery, and disease diagnosis are practical uses that confer “specific benefits” to the public**

The claimed invention has specific, substantial, real-world utility by virtue of its use in toxicology testing, drug development and disease diagnosis through gene expression profiling. These uses are explained in detail in the accompanying Furness Declaration, the substance of which is not rebutted by the Patent Examiner. There is no dispute that the claimed invention is in fact a useful tool in two-dimensional polyacrylamide gel electrophoresis (“2-D PAGE”) analysis and western blots used to monitor protein expression and assess drug toxicity.

The instant application is a divisional of, and claims priority to, United States patent application Serial No.09/386,493, having the identical Specification, (hereinafter “the Kaser ’493 application”).

In his Declaration, Mr. Furness explains the many reasons why a person skilled in the art who read the Kaser ’493 application on August 30, 1999 would have understood that application to disclose the claimed polypeptide to be useful for a number of gene and protein expression monitoring applications, e.g., in 2-D PAGE technologies, in connection with the development of drugs and the monitoring of the activity of such drugs. (Furness Declaration at, e.g., ¶¶ 11-15).

Much, but not all, of Mr. Furness' explanation concerns the use of the claimed polypeptide in the creation of protein expression maps using 2-D PAGE.

2-D PAGE technologies were developed during the 1980's. Since the early 1990's, 2-D PAGE has been used to create maps showing the differential expression of proteins in different cell types or in similar cell types in response to drugs and potential toxic agents. Each expression pattern reveals the state of a tissue or cell type in its given environment, e.g., in the presence or absence of a drug. By comparing a map of cells treated with a potential drug candidate to a map of cells not treated with the candidate, for example, the potential toxicity of a drug can be assessed. (Furness Declaration at ¶ 11.)

The claimed invention makes 2-D PAGE analysis a more powerful tool for toxicology and drug efficacy testing. A person of ordinary skill in the art can derive more information about the state or states or tissue or cell samples from 2-D PAGE analysis with the claimed invention than without it. As Mr. Furness explains:

In view of the Kaser '493 application.... and other related pre-August 1999 publications, persons skilled in the art on August 30, 1999 clearly would have understood the Kaser '493 application to disclose the SEQ ID NO:6 polypeptide to be useful in 2-D PAGE analyses for the development of new drugs and monitoring the activities of drugs for such purposes as evaluating their efficacy and toxicity . . . . (Furness Declaration, ¶ 10)

\* \* \*

Persons skilled in the art would appreciate that a 2-D PAGE map that utilized the SEQ ID NO:6 polypeptide sequence would be a more useful tool than a 2-D PAGE map that did not utilize this protein sequence in connection with conducting protein expression monitoring studies on proposed (or actual) drugs for treating cancer for such purposes as evaluating their efficacy and toxicity. (Furness Declaration, ¶ 12)

Mr. Furness' observations are confirmed in the literature published before the filing of the patent application. Wilkins, for example, describes how 2-D gels are used to define proteins present in various tissues and measure their levels of expression, the data from which is in turn used in databases:

For proteome projects, the aim of [computer-aided 2-D PAGE] analysis . . . is to catalogue all spots from the 2-D gel in a qualitative and if possible quantitative manner, so as to define the number of proteins present and their levels of

expression. Reference gel images, constructed from one or more gels, for the basis of two-dimensional gel databases. (Wilkins, Tab C, p. 26).

**B. The use of proteins expressed by humans as tools for toxicology testing, drug discovery, and the diagnosis of disease is now "well-established"**

The technologies made possible by expression profiling using polypeptides are now well-established. The technical literature recognizes not only the prevalence of these technologies, but also their unprecedented advantages in drug development, testing and safety assessment. These technologies include toxicology testing, as described by Furness in his Declaration.

Toxicology testing is now standard practice in the pharmaceutical industry. See, e.g., John C. Rockett, et. al., Differential gene expression in drug metabolism and toxicology: practicalities, problems, and potential, Xenobiotica 29:655-691 (July 1999) (Reference No. 1);

Knowledge of toxin-dependent regulation in target tissues is not solely an academic pursuit as much interest has been generated in the pharmaceutical industry to harness this technology in the early identification of toxic drug candidates, thereby shortening the developmental process and contributing substantially to the safety assessment of new drugs. ((Reference No. 1), page 656)

To the same effect are several other scientific publications, including Emile F. Nuwaysir, et al., Microarrays and Toxicology: The Advent of Toxicogenomics, Molecular Carcinogenesis 24:153-159 (1999) (Reference No. 2); Sandra Steiner and N. Leigh Anderson, Expression profiling in toxicology -- potentials and limitations, Toxicology Letters 112-13:467-471 (2000) (Reference No. 3).

The more genes – and, accordingly, the polypeptides they encode -- that are available for use in toxicology testing, the more powerful the technique. Control genes are carefully selected for their stability across a large set of array experiments in order to best study the effect of toxicological compounds. See attached email from the primary investigator of the Nuwaysir paper, Dr. Cynthia Afshari to an Incyte employee, dated July 3, 2000, as well as the original message to which she was responding (Reference No. 4) Thus, there is no expressed gene which is irrelevant to screening for toxicological effects, and all expressed genes have a utility for toxicological screening.

In fact, the potential benefit to the public, in terms of lives saved and reduced health care costs, are enormous. Recent developments provide evidence that the benefits of this information are already beginning to manifest themselves. Examples include the following:

- In 1999, CV Therapeutics, an Incyte collaborator, was able to use Incyte gene expression technology, information about the structure of a known transporter gene, and chromosomal mapping location, to identify the key gene associated with Tangier disease. This discovery took place over a matter of only a few weeks, due to the power of these new genomics technologies. The discovery received an award from the American Heart Association as one of the top 10 discoveries associated with heart disease research in 1999.
- In an April 9, 2000, article published by the Bloomberg news service, an Incyte customer stated that it had reduced the time associated with target discovery and validation from 36 months to 18 months, through use of Incyte's genomic information database. Other Incyte customers have privately reported similar experiences. The implications of this significant saving of time and expense for the number of drugs that may be developed and their cost are obvious.
- In a February 10, 2000, article in the *Wall Street Journal*, one Incyte customer stated that over 50 percent of the drug targets in its current pipeline were derived from the Incyte database. Other Incyte customers have privately reported similar experiences. By doubling the number of targets available to pharmaceutical researchers, Incyte genomic information has demonstrably accelerated the development of new drugs.

Because the Patent Examiner failed to address or consider the "well-established" utilities for the claimed invention in toxicology testing, drug development, and the diagnosis of disease, the Examiner's rejections should be overturned regardless of their merit.

### C. Objective evidence corroborates the utilities of the claimed invention

There is in fact no restriction on the kinds of evidence a Patent Examiner may consider in determining whether a "real-world" utility exists. "Real-world" evidence, such as evidence showing actual use or commercial success of the invention, can demonstrate conclusive proof of utility. *Raytheon v. Roper*, 220 USPQ2d 592 (Fed. Cir. 1983); *Nestle v. Eugene*, 55 F.2d 854, 856, 12 USPQ 335 (6th Cir. 1932). Indeed, proof that the invention is made, used or sold by any person or entity other than the patentee is conclusive proof of utility. *United States Steel Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.*, 865 F.2d 1247, 1252, 9 USPQ2d 1461 (Fed. Cir. 1989).

Over the past several years, a vibrant market has developed for databases containing all expressed genes (along with the polypeptide translations of those genes). (Note that the value in these databases is enhanced by their completeness, but each sequence in them is independently valuable.) The databases sold by Appellants' assignee, Incyte, include exactly the kinds of information made possible by the claimed invention, such as tissue and disease associations. Incyte sells its database containing the claimed sequence and millions of other sequences throughout the scientific community, including to pharmaceutical companies who use the information to develop new pharmaceuticals.

Both Incyte's customers and the scientific community have acknowledged that Incyte's databases have proven to be valuable in, for example, the identification and development of drug candidates. As Incyte adds information to its databases, including the information that can be generated only as a result of Incyte's discovery of the claimed polypeptide, the databases become even more powerful tools. Thus the claimed invention adds more than incremental benefit to the drug discovery and development process.

### **III. The Patent Examiner's Rejections Are Without Merit**

Rather than responding to the evidence demonstrating utility, the Examiner attempts to dismiss it altogether by arguing that the disclosed and well-established utilities for the claimed polypeptide are not "specific, substantial, and credible" utilities. (Office Action at p. 3) The Examiner is incorrect both as a matter of law and as a matter of fact.

#### **A. Membership in a Class of Useful Products Can Be Proof of Utility**

Despite the uncontradicted evidence that the claimed polypeptides are expressed polypeptides (encoded by expressed polynucleotides), the Examiner refused to impute the utility of the members of the family of expressed polypeptides to the claimed polypeptides. In the Office Action, the Patent Examiner takes the position that, unless Appellants can identify a specific biological activity for the claimed polypeptides, utility cannot be imputed.

In order to demonstrate utility by membership in a class, the law requires only that the class not contain a substantial number of useless members. So long as the class does not contain a substantial number of useless members, there is sufficient likelihood that the claimed invention

will have utility, and a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is improper. That is true regardless of how the claimed invention ultimately is used and whether or not the members of the class possess one utility or many. *See Brenner v. Manson*, 383 U.S. 519, 532 (1966); *Application of Kirk*, 376 F.2d 936, 943 (CCPA 1967).

Membership in a “general” class is insufficient to demonstrate utility only if the class contains a sufficient number of useless members such that a person of ordinary skill in the art could not impute utility by a substantial likelihood. There would be, in that case, a substantial likelihood that the claimed invention is one of the useless members of the class. In the few cases in which class membership did not prove utility by substantial likelihood, the classes did in fact include predominately useless members. *E.g., Brenner* (man-made steroids); *Kirk* (same); *Natta* (man-made polyethylene polymers).

The Examiner addresses the claimed polypeptides as if the general class in which it is included is not the family of expressed polypeptides, but rather all polypeptides, including the vast majority of useless theoretical molecules not occurring in nature, and thus not pre-selected by nature to be useful. While these “general classes” may contain a substantial number of useless members, the family of expressed polypeptides does not. The family of expressed polypeptides is sufficiently specific to rule out any reasonable possibility that the claimed polynucleotides would not also be useful like the other members of the family.

Because the Examiner has not presented any evidence that the family of expressed polypeptides has any, let alone a substantial number, of useless members, the Examiner must conclude that there is a “substantial likelihood” that the claimed polypeptides are useful.

#### **B. The Precise Biological Role Or Function Of An Expressed Polypeptide Is Not Required To Demonstrate Utility**

The Patent Examiner’s primary rejection of the claimed invention is based on the ground that, without information as to the precise “biological role” of the claimed invention, the claimed invention’s utility is not sufficiently specific. See Office Action at p. 3. According to the Examiner, it is not enough that a person of ordinary skill in the art could use and, in fact, would want to use the claimed invention either by itself or in a 2-D gel or western blot to monitor the expression of genes for such applications as the evaluation of a drug’s efficacy and toxicity. The

Examiner would require, in addition, that the applicant provide a specific and substantial interpretation of the results generated in any given expression analysis.

It may be that specific and substantial interpretations and detailed information on biological function are necessary to satisfy the requirements for publication in some technical journals, but they are not necessary to satisfy the requirements for obtaining a United States patent. The relevant question is not, as the Examiner would have it, whether it is known how or why the invention works, *In re Cortwright*, 165 F.3d 1353, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999), but rather whether the invention provides an "identifiable benefit" in presently available form. *Juicy Whip Inc. v. Orange Bang Inc.*, 185 F.3d 1364, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999). If the benefit exists, and there is a substantial likelihood the invention provides the benefit, it is useful. There can be no doubt, particularly in view of the Furness Declaration (at, e.g., ¶¶ 9-13), that the present invention meets this test.

The threshold for determining whether an invention produces an identifiable benefit is low. *Juicy Whip*, 185 F.3d at 1366. Only those utilities that are so nebulous that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not know how to achieve an identifiable benefit and, at least according to the PTO guidelines, so-called "throwaway" utilities that are not directed to a person of ordinary skill in the art at all, do not meet the statutory requirement of utility. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001).

Knowledge of the biological function or role of a biological molecule has never been required to show real-world benefit. In its most recent explanation of its own utility guidelines, the PTO acknowledged as much (66 F.R. at 1095):

[T]he utility of a claimed DNA does not necessarily depend on the function of the encoded gene product. A claimed DNA may have specific and substantial utility because, e.g., it hybridizes near a disease-associated gene or it has gene-regulating activity.

By implicitly requiring knowledge of biological function for any claimed polypeptide, the Examiner has, contrary to law, elevated what is at most an evidentiary factor into an absolute requirement of utility. Rather than looking to the biological role or function of the claimed invention, the Examiner should have looked first to the benefits it is alleged to provide.

C. The uses of SEQ ID NO:6 in toxicology testing, drug discovery, and disease diagnosis are practical uses beyond mere study of the invention itself

The Examiner's rejection of the claims at issue as not a "substantial" use is tantamount to a rejection based on an allegation that the only use of the claimed invention is as a tool for further research. See Office Action at p. 4. Because the Examiner's rejection assumes a substantial overstatement of the law, and is incorrect in fact, it must be overturned.

There is no authority for the proposition that use as a tool for research is not a substantial utility. Indeed, the Patent Office itself has recognized that just because an invention is used in a research setting does not mean that it lacks utility (Section 2107.01 of the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure, 8<sup>th</sup> Edition, August 2001, under the heading I. Specific and Substantial Requirements, Research Tools):

Many research tools such as gas chromatographs, screening assays, and nucleotide sequencing techniques have a clear, specific and unquestionable utility (e.g., they are useful in analyzing compounds). An assessment that focuses on whether an invention is useful only in a research setting thus does not address whether the specific invention is in fact "useful" in a patent sense. Instead, Office personnel must distinguish between inventions that have a specifically identified substantial utility and inventions whose asserted utility requires further research to identify or reasonably confirm.

The PTO's actual practice has been, at least until the present, consistent with that approach. It has routinely issued patents for inventions whose only use is to facilitate research, such as DNA ligases, acknowledged by the PTO's Training Materials to be useful.

The subset of research uses that are not "substantial" utilities is limited. It consists only of those uses in which the claimed invention is to be an **object** of further study, thus merely inviting further research on the invention itself. This follows from *Brenner*, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that a process for making a compound does not confer a substantial benefit where the only known use of the compound was to be the object of further research to determine its use. *Id.* at 535. Similarly, in *Kirk*, the Court held that a compound would not confer substantial benefit on the public merely because it might be used to synthesize some other, unknown compound that would confer substantial benefit. *Kirk*, 376 F.2d at 940, 945. ("What appellants are really saying to those in the art is take these steroids, experiment, and find what

use they do have as medicines.”) Nowhere do those cases state or imply, however, that a material cannot be patentable if it has some other, additional beneficial use in research.

Such beneficial uses beyond studying the claimed invention itself have been demonstrated, in particular those described in the Furness Declaration. The Furness Declaration demonstrates that the claimed invention is a tool, rather than an object, of research, and it demonstrates exactly how that tool is used. Without the claimed invention, it would be more difficult to generate information regarding the properties of tissues, cells, drug candidates and toxins apart from additional information about the polypeptide itself.

The claimed invention has numerous other uses as a research tool, each of which alone is a “substantial utility.” These include the use of the protein in screening assays to identify specific ligands.

#### **IV. By Requiring the Patent Applicant to Assert a Particular or Unique Utility, the Patent Examination Utility Guidelines and Training Materials Applied by the Patent Examiner Misstate the Law**

There is an additional, independent reason to overturn the rejections: to the extent the rejections are based on Revised Interim Utility Examination Guidelines (64 FR 71427, December 21, 1999), the final Utility Examination Guidelines (66 FR 1092, January 5, 2001) and/or the Revised Interim Utility Guidelines Training Materials (USPTO Website [www.uspto.gov](http://www.uspto.gov), March 1, 2000), the Guidelines and Training Materials are themselves inconsistent with the law.

The Training Materials, which direct the Examiners regarding how to apply the Utility Guidelines, address the issue of specificity with reference to two kinds of asserted utilities: “specific” utilities, which meet the statutory requirements, and “general” utilities, which do not. The Training Materials define a “specific utility” as follows:

A [specific utility] is *specific* to the subject matter claimed. This contrasts to *general* utility that would be applicable to the broad class of invention. For example, a claim to a polynucleotide whose use is disclosed simply as “gene probe” or “chromosome marker” would not be considered to be specific in the absence of a disclosure of a specific DNA target. Similarly, a general statement of diagnostic utility, such as diagnosing an unspecified disease, would ordinarily be insufficient absent a disclosure of what condition can be diagnosed.

The Training Materials distinguish between “specific” and “general” utilities by assessing whether the asserted utility is sufficiently “particular,” *i.e.*, unique (Training Materials at p.52) as compared to the “broad class of invention.” (In this regard, the Training Materials appear to parallel the view set forth in Stephen G. Kunin, Written Description Guidelines and Utility Guidelines, 82 J.P.T.O.S. 77, 97 (Feb. 2000) (“With regard to the issue of specific utility the question to ask is whether or not a utility set forth in the specification is *particular* to the claimed invention.”).)

Such “unique” or “particular” utilities never have been required by the law. To meet the utility requirement, the invention need only be “practically useful,” *Natta*, 480 F.2d 1 at 1397, and confer a “specific benefit” on the public. *Brenner*, 383 U.S. at 534. Thus incredible “throwaway” utilities, such as trying to “patent a transgenic mouse by saying it makes great snake food,” do not meet this standard. Karen Hall, Genomic Warfare, The American Lawyer 68 (June 2000) (quoting John Doll, Chief of the Biotech Section of USPTO).

This does not preclude, however, a general utility, contrary to the statement in the Training Materials where “specific utility” is defined (page 5). Practical real-world uses are not limited to uses that are unique to an invention. The law requires that the practical utility be “definite,” not particular. *Montedison*, 664 F.2d at 375. Appellant is not aware of any court that has rejected an assertion of utility on the grounds that it is not “particular” or “unique” to the specific invention. Where courts have found utility to be too “general,” it has been in those cases in which the asserted utility in the patent disclosure was not a practical use that conferred a specific benefit. That is, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been left to guess as to how to benefit at all from the invention. In *Kirk*, for example, the CCPA held the assertion that a man-made steroid had “useful biological activity” was insufficient where there was no information in the specification as to how that biological activity could be practically used. *Kirk*, 376 F.2d at 941.

The fact that an invention can have a particular use does not provide a basis for requiring a particular use. *See Brana, supra* (disclosure describing a claimed antitumor compound as being homologous to an antitumor compound having activity against a “particular” type of cancer

was determined to satisfy the specificity requirement). “Particularity” is not and never has been the *sine qua non* of utility; it is, at most, one of many factors to be considered.

As described *supra*, broad classes of inventions can satisfy the utility requirement so long as a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand how to achieve a practical benefit from knowledge of the class. Only classes that encompass a significant portion of nonuseful members would fail to meet the utility requirement. *Supra* § III.A. (*Montedison*, 664 F.2d at 374-75).

The Training Materials fail to distinguish between broad classes that convey information of practical utility and those that do not, lumping all of them into the latter, unpatentable category of “general” utilities. As a result, the Training Materials paint with too broad a brush. Rigorously applied, they would render unpatentable whole categories of inventions heretofore considered to be patentable, and that have indisputably benefitted the public, including the claimed invention. *See supra* § III.A. Thus the Training Materials cannot be applied consistently with the law.

**V. To the extent the rejection of the claimed invention under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, is based on the improper rejection for lack of utility under 35 U.S.C. § 101, it must be reversed.**

The rejection set forth in the Office Action is based on the assertions discussed above, i.e., that the claimed invention lacks patentable utility. To the extent that the rejection under § 112, first paragraph, is based on the improper allegation of lack of patentable utility under § 101, it fails for the same reasons.

**(9) CONCLUSION**

Appellants respectfully submit that rejections for lack of utility based, *inter alia*, on an allegation of “lack of specificity,” as set forth in the Office Action and as justified in the Revised Interim and final Utility Guidelines and Training Materials, are not supported in the law. Neither are they scientifically correct, nor supported by any evidence or sound scientific reasoning. These rejections are alleged to be founded on facts in court cases such as *Brenner* and *Kirk*, yet those facts are clearly distinguishable from the facts of the instant application, and indeed most if not all nucleotide and protein sequence applications. Nevertheless, the PTO is attempting to

mold the facts and holdings of these prior cases, "like a nose of wax,"<sup>1</sup> to target rejections of claims to polypeptide and polynucleotide sequences, as well as to claims to methods of detecting said polynucleotide sequences, where biological activity information has not been proven by laboratory experimentation, and they have done so by ignoring perfectly acceptable utilities fully disclosed in the specifications as well as well-established utilities known to those of skill in the art. As is disclosed in the specification, and even more clearly, as one of ordinary skill in the art would understand, the claimed invention has well-established, specific, substantial and credible utilities. The rejections are, therefore, improper and should be reversed.

Moreover, to the extent the above rejections were based on the Revised Interim and final Examination Guidelines and Training Materials, those portions of the Guidelines and Training Materials that form the basis for the rejections should be determined to be inconsistent with the law.

Applicants therefore submit that specific and substantial utilities for the claimed invention have been established in the diagnosis and treatment of disease, in particular, cancers associated with PAH exposure, and in toxicology testing and drug discovery. Withdrawal of the rejection of claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is therefore requested

35 U.S.C. § 112, First Paragraph, Rejection of Claims 15-16 and 19

The Examiner has also rejected claims 15-16 and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, specifically, since the claimed invention is not supported by either a specific and substantial asserted utility or a well-established utility for the reasons set forth above, one skilled in the art clearly would not know how to use the claimed invention. To the extent that the Examiner's rejection of these claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101 are without merit for the reasons discussed above, applicants submit that the claimed invention is supported by a specific and substantial asserted utility and one skilled in the art would therefore know how to use the claimed invention for that purpose.

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<sup>1</sup>"The concept of patentable subject matter under §101 is not 'like a nose of wax which may be turned and twisted in any direction \* \* \*.' *White v. Dunbar*, 119 U.S. 47, 51." (*Parker v. Flook*, 198 USPQ 193 (US SupCt 1978))

The Examiner stated further that the current disclosure sets forth an immunogenic fragment of the claimed protein. Yet, the specification provides no teachings, direction and working examples in regard to preparation of any fragments and testing of their immunogenicity. The Examiner stated that the instant claim language "a immunogenic fragment" includes a large quantity of subsequences, i.e., variants (the number of variants is estimated at least  $1.7 \times 10^5$ ). --- the specification does not provide any working examples of any subsequences.

Applicants have previously pointed out where, in the specification, methods of identifying suitable immunogenic fragments for any particular protein, including SEQ ID NO:6, are found (see, in particular, Example VIII at pp. 22-23 of the specification), as well as methods of making said antibodies (see specification, in particular, at p. 17, lines 18-31), and the fact that these methods are well known in the art (as well as well referenced in the specification). "A patent need not teach, and preferably omits what is well known in the art". See MPEP § 2164.01. It is well known in the art, and specifically stated in the specification, that suitable antigenic fragments for antibody production are at least 15 amino acid residues in length, and further addresses how to select appropriate such fragments from accessible regions of the molecule. See, in particular, the paragraph beginning at p. 22, line 34. Thus, the Examiner's contention that applicants claim to immunogenic fragments of SEQ ID NO:6 encompasses a large quantity (estimated by the Examiner to be at least  $1.7 \times 10^5$ ) is unfounded. The Examiner discusses, at length, the issue of how protein folding affects secondary structure and the uncertainty in identifying suitable antigenic epitopes in the folded structure of a protein. However, these considerations are also well known in the art, as well as disclosed in the specification. The specification describes, for example, the use of software such as LASERGENE (DNASTAR) for identifying regions of high immunogenicity based on hydrophobicity/hydrophilicity profiles that specifically locates the most likely exposed surface regions of the molecule thus substantially reducing the uncertainty in identifying suitable epitopes (see specification, at p 22 bridging p. 23).

Based on the disclosure of the specification and the level of one skilled in the art at the time the application was filed, it would therefore not require undue experimentation by the skilled artisan to identify and prepare suitable immunogenic fragments of SEQ ID NO:6 for

**Docket No.: PB-0011-1 DIV**

antibody production, and to produce said antibodies. Withdrawal of the rejection of claims under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph is therefore requested.

CONCLUSION

In light of the above amendments and remarks, Applicants submit that the present application is fully in condition for allowance, and request that the Examiner withdraw the outstanding rejections. Early notice to that effect is earnestly solicited. Applicants further request that, upon allowance of claim 15, claims 20, 21, and 23 be rejoined and examined as methods of use of the polypeptide of claim 15 that depend from and are of the same scope as claim 15 in accordance with *In Re: Ochiai* and the MPEP § 821.04.


If the Examiner contemplates other action, or if a telephone conference would expedite allowance of the claims, Applicants invite the Examiner to contact Applicants' Attorney at (650) 855-0555.

Applicants believe that no fee is due with this communication. However, if the USPTO determines that a fee is due, the Commissioner is hereby authorized to charge Deposit Account No. **09-0108**.

Respectfully submitted,

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Enclosures:

1. John C. Rockett, et. al., Differential gene expression in drug metabolism and toxicology: practicalities, problems, and potential, Xenobiotica 29:655-691 (July 1999).
2. Emile F. Nuwaysir, et al., Microarrays and Toxicology: The Advent of Toxicogenomics, Molecular Carcinogenesis 24:153-159 (1999).

3. Sandra Steiner and N. Leigh Anderson, Expression profiling in toxicology -- potentials and limitations, Toxicology Letters 112-13:467-471 (2000).
4. Email from the primary investigator, Dr. Cynthia Afshari to an Incyte employee, dated July 3, 2000, as well as the original message to which she was responding.